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Some Traditional Thinking about Non-
Traditional Searches: Mandatory Drug
Testing, the Fourth Amendment and the
Supreme Court's Balancing Methodology
David Siegelt
Drug testing of public employees is now an issue of considera-
ble political importance because the current administration has
made it one of major public concern.' It is also an issue of consid-
erable constitutional importance because it implicates the rights of
several million people protected by the Fourth Amendment. 2 It
will remain an important constitutional issue, even if it fades from
t B.A. 1984, The University of Chicago; J.D. Candidate 1989, The University of
Chicago.
' Calls for testing of the nation's airline pilots, train engineers and federal employees
have come from President Reagan, (former) Secretary of Transportation Dole and (then)
Attorney General Meese. See Penny Pagano, U.S. Will Require Random Drug Tests for
Flight Crews, L.A. Times 1 (January 22, 1987); Reginald Stuart, Amtrak Crash Spurs Call
for Random Drug Tests, N.Y. Times sec. A, 22 (Jan. 22, 1987); Robert Pear, Testing Plan
Indicates Reagan's Outrage Over Drug Abuse, N.Y. Times sec. E, 4 (Dec. 7, 1986). See also
President's Commission on Organized Crime, America's Habit: Drug Abuse, Drug Traffick-
ing, and Organized Crime 483 (1986), quoted in Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n. v. Burn-
ley, 839 F.2d 575, 582 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. granted 108 S. Ct. 2033 (1988); Exec. Order No.
12,564, 51 Fed. Reg. 32,889 (1986) (order for a "Drug-Free Federal Workplace"), cited in
Burnley, 839 F.2d at 582, and in National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 816
F.2d 170, 172 n. 1 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. granted 108 S. Ct. 1072 (1988).
2 The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and par-
ticularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
U.S. Const. amend. IV. The text of the Amendment does not distinguish between civil and
criminal searches and seizures. "Every court that has considered the matter has similarly
concluded that urine tests ... are searches for [Flourth [A]mendment purposes." Burnley,
839 F.2d at 580.
The number of persons affected by potential federal drug testing programs is large.
There are thouiands of civilian federal employees, and military personnel are already sub-
ject to random drug testing. See Committee for G.I. Rights v. Callaway, 518 F.2d 466 (D.C.
Cir. 1975) (upholding random drug testing of military personnel). Many private employees
in heavily regulated industries might also be subject to federal drug testing programs; rail-
road employees, for example, are subject to the Federal Railroad Administration's testing
program. These testing programs present Fourth Amendment issues because they are ad-
ministered by state actors. See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
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public consciousness under future administrations, because the Su-
preme Court will soon consider the constitutionality of a program
of mandatory drug tests for certain federal employees.3
The Court will consider drug testing when its own Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence addressing searches outside the tradi-
tional context of criminal law enforcement has become controver-
sial both on and off the bench.4 In these cases a government official
whose duties do not include criminal law enforcement conducts a
search. The search may examine a person, personal effects, a home
or an office.' Although these searches are not designed to locate
evidence of criminal activity, they have at least an investigative
"flavor" because they often proceed in an area that is not open to
the public. Their purposes, either declared by the official con-
ducting the search or divined after the fact by the Court, vary
widely.'
Under the Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, "non-
traditional" searches can withstand constitutional scrutiny despite
being made without probable cause or a warrant.7 In these cases
' Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170 (cited in note 1) (reviewing U.S. Customs Service program of
mandatory drug tests for employees seeking transfers to positions involving drug interdic-
tion, access to classified information or the carrying of a firearm). See notes 65-75 and ac-
companying text.
The court calls these searches "administrative searches," although this is a misnomer
because they often proceed without any defined policy or procedure. For criticism from
commentators, see Silas J. Wasserstrom, The Incredible Shrinking Fourth Amendment, 21
Am. Crim. L. Rev. 257 (Winter 1984); Note, The Civil and Criminal Methodologies of the
Fourth Amendment, 93 Yale L.J. 1127, 1140 (1984); Yale Kamisar, Drugs, AIDS and the
Threat to Privacy, N.Y. Times Magazine 109 (Sept. 13, 1987). For criticism by members of
the Court, see New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, concurring);
O'Connor v. Ortega, 107 S. Ct. 1492, 1511 (1987) (Blackmun, dissenting); United States v.
Place, 462 U.S. 696, 721-22 and n. 1 (1983) (Blackmun, concurring); U.S. v. Martinez-Fu-
erte, 428 U.S. 543, 570 (1975) (Brennan, dissenting).
Searches of the person: T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (search of high school student's purse by
school officials); Hudson v. Palmer, 104 S. Ct. 3194 (1984) (searches of prison inmates).
Searches of a home: Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967) (housing code
inspections); Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971) (welfare case worker home interviews);
Griffin v. Wisconsin, 107 S. Ct. 3164 (1987) (search of probationer's home).
Searches of offices: O'Connor, 107 S. Ct. 1492 (employer search of employee's desk and
files); N.Y. v. Burger, 107 S. Ct. 2636 (1987) (search of auto junkyard for stolen car parts);
Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594 (1981) (workplace inspection of mines).
6 They have included: Policing the border, Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (cited in note
4); maintaining school discipline, T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325; maintaining easy access to govern-
ment files, O'Connor, 107 S. Ct. 1492; maintaining prison discipline, Hudson, 104 S. Ct.
3194; ensuring workplace safety, Dewey, 452 U.S. 594.
' The plain words of the Fourth Amendment require that a search be made only with a
warrant supported by probable cause. The Supreme Court has interpreted this as not apply-
ing to brief investigative stops made by police, which may be made on the basis of reasona-
ble suspicion. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968). Before Terry, a search without a warrant
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the Court "balances" the interests in privacy and personal secur-
ity8 against the government's interest in addressing the problem
that the search is ostensibly designed to remedy.' Under this ap-
proach, the search is constitutional if it meets an overall test of
"reasonableness" or "reasonableness under the circumstances.' 0
The Court has routinely balanced in favor of the asserted govern-
mental interest and upheld the search."
The Court's analysis of non-traditional searches has lacked
consistency and has produced distinctions between what are often
quite similar situations. These incongruities provide inadequate
or probable cause was per se unreasonable, subject to an exception for exigent circum-
stances. In Terry, the Court divided the Fourth Amendment into the "warrant" and "rea-
sonableness" clauses, holding that the warrant requirement applies only to full-blown
searches and seizures and not to "stop-and-frisk" searches, which merely require reasonable
suspicion.
None of the traditional exceptions to the warrant requirement, which arise in the con-
text of ordinary police work, are applicable to non-traditional searches. These exceptions
include: Searches incident to a lawful arrest, Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); exi-
gent circumstances, Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925), later expanded to include
the "automobile exception", Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973); hot pursuit, Warden
v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967); or plain view, Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443
(1971). "Except in certain carefully defined classes of cases, a search of private property
without proper consent is 'unreasonable' unless it has been authorized by a valid search
warrant." Camara, 387 U.S. at 528-29 (cited in note 5), cited in Almeida-Sanchez v. United
States, 413 U.S. 266, 279-80 (1973).
8 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 337 (cited in note 4).
' In considering non-traditional searches, the Court "balanc[es] the nature and quality
of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the importance of
the governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion." Place, 462 U.S. at 703 (cited in
note 4), quoted in O'Connor, 107 S. Ct. at 1499 (cited in note 4). "[Plermissibility of a
particular law enforcement practice is judged by balancing its intrusion on the individual's
Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests."
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979) (footnote omitted). "Balancing" is really a
misnomer, because the Court does not actually engage in a weighing process but in an or-
dered consideration of different interests. For a discussion of the "balancing" process, see
notes 21-28 and accompanying text.
o The Court developed the test for "reasonableness" in Terry, 392 U.S. 1 (cited in note
7). In T.L.O., the Court described the Terry test as involving a two-fold inquiry: "[F]irst,
one must consider 'whether the .. .action was justified at its inception,' . . . ; second, one
must determine whether the search as actually conducted 'was reasonably related in scope
to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place .... 469 U.S. at 341
(cited in note 4) (cites omitted). The reasonableness inquiry was characterized in T.L.O. as a
test for "reasonableness, under all the circumstances." Id.
A balancing approach to reasonableness has occasionally been considered by the Court
in disputes involving traditional searches and seizures by police. See Tennessee v. Garner,
105 S. Ct. 1694, 1700-01 (1985) (despite a strong government interest in effective law en-
forcement, "the use of deadly force is [not] a sufficiently productive means of ... [achieving
the interest] to justify the killing of non-violent suspects .... The use of deadly force to
prevent the escape of all felony suspects, whatever the circumstances, is constitutionally
unreasonable") (cites omitted).
" See administrative search cases cited in note 5.
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guidance to lower courts and leave them particularly susceptible to
improper decisionmaking considerations, such as the recent politi-
cal furor over drug use.1 2 The use of a balancing test in drug test-
ing cases also has caused an undervaluation of the interests of indi-
viduals; simultaneously, some courts have overemphasized the
interests of the government by aggregating the interests of society
in preventing drug use without aggregating the privacy interests of
individuals subjected to testing."3 What has resulted from courts'
use of the balancing methodology is an emerging presumption that
non-traditional searches, made without a warrant or probable
cause, are in fact constitutional."'
The element missing from current analysis of non-traditional
searches is the opposite presumption, consistent with at least the
text of the Fourth Amendment, that warrantless searches without
probable cause are unconstitutional.' 5 It makes little sense to argue
that the Fourth Amendment protects individuals from "unreasona-
ble" searches yet in the same breath admit that, in cases involving
the types of searches to which the largest proportion of the popula-
tion is realistically susceptible, the individual citizen must prove
an interest in not being searched that outweighs the government's
interest in conducting the search."
2 Several cases examining the constitutionality of mandatory drug testing have cited
increased public concern about drug use, the increased federal commitment to its eradica-
tion, or both. See Von Raab, 816 F.2d at 172 (cited in note 1); Burnley, 839 F.2d at 582
(cited in note 1). See also Wayne R. LaFave, Fourth Amendment Vagaries (Of Improbable
Cause, Imperceptible Plain View, Notorious Privacy, and Balancing Askew), 74 J. Crim. L.
& Criminology 1171, 1223 (1983) (suggesting that all nine Fourth Amendment decisions of
the 1982 Supreme Court term which upheld the searches at issue were "attributable in part
to a perception by the Court that more law enforcement tools are essential to combat the
drug traffic"). See also Steven Wisotsky, Crackdown: The Emerging "Drug Exception" to
the Bill of Rights, 38 Hastings L.J. 889 (1987).
" See discussion of drug testing cases at notes 56-75.
" The Court has found that, although the Fourth Amendment applies to non-tradi-
tional searches, it demands less scrutiny than when it is applied to traditional searches
made for the purposes of locating evidence of criminal activity. See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 337
(cited in note 4) ("[t]o hold that the Fourth Amendment applies to [certain] searches ... is
only to begin the inquiry into the standards governing such searches .... [Wihat is reasona-
ble depends on the context within which a search takes place").
"' "[1It is by now axiomatic that the Fourth Amendment's proscription of 'unreasonable
searches and seizures' is to be read in conjunction with its command that 'no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause.' Under our cases, both the concept of probable cause and
the requirement of a warrant bear on the reasonableness of a search, though in certain lim-
ited circumstances neither is required.' " Id. at 340, quoting Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. at
277 (cited in note 7) (Powell, concurring). The restrictive clause that inevitably accompanies
this "axiom" is that 'probable cause' is not an irreducible requirement of a valid search."
T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340.
" See Camara, 387 U.S. at 530 (cited in note 5) ("[it is surely anomalous to say that
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The balancing methodology, as applied to non-traditional
searches, has two shortcomings: First, it is not a neutral weighing
of interests that relies on an objective, universally agreed upon
metric; 17 second, even if balancing involved an objective weighing
of interests, the Fourth Amendment protects precisely the sort of
unbalanced preference for an individual's Fourth Amendment
rights against legitimate, perhaps even overwhelming societal
interests. 18
This Comment will argue that the Court should employ, in
place of its current balancing approach, a methodology that con-
siders the privacy interests of all individuals instead of merely the
governmental interests behind the search. According to this meth-
odology, a drug test is reasonable for Fourth Amendment purposes
if it is based on individualized, reasonable suspicion of on-the-job
drug use or impairment; it is the least intrusive means available;
and it is conducted with a minimum of administrative discretion.
This Comment has four parts. Part I details the history of the
Supreme Court's treatment of non-traditional searches and its de-
velopment of the balancing test; Part II examines the Fourth
Amendment values implicated by drug testing; Part III identifies
the inadequate protection the balancing methodology affords these
values in the case of drug testing; and Part IV proposes a constitu-
tional drug testing program that avoids these pitfalls.
I. THE HISTORY OF THE NON-TRADITIONAL SEARCH AND THE
BALANCING METHODOLOGY
The Supreme Court first explained the Fourth Amendment's
purpose as providing 'self-protection' against overly aggressive law
enforcement activities which might threaten political liberty.19
This early understanding of the Amendment linked its protections
to those of the Fifth Amendment. Another view of the Fourth
the individual and his private property are fully protected by the Fourth Amendment only
when the individual is suspected of criminal behavior") (footnote omitted). See also Wy-
man, 400 U.S. at 317 (cited in note 5).
" See notes 65-73 and accompanying text.
18 See generally Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 184-222 (1978) (setting forth
a concept of individual rights that "trumps" social utilities).
"' Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). The Court incidentally touched on the
Fourth Amendment in Ex Parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1877), where it held that the Fourth
Amendment's warrant requirement for seizure of personal papers extended to papers in the
public mails.
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Amendment, increasingly recognized in recent years, is as a right
of privacy from unreasonable government intrusion.2"
In Camara v. Municipal Court," however, the Court intro-
duced an interpretation of the Fourth Amendment which limited
its protections in situations where neither potentially abusive law
enforcement activities nor significant invasions of privacy were in-
volved and where the search would serve some great public inter-
est. Camara involved a program of housing code inspections which
proceeded on less than probable cause. In upholding the program,
the Court developed a new type of "administrative warrant" search
that could be issued on less than traditional probable cause "if rea-
sonable legislative or administrative standards for conducting an
area inspection are satisfied with respect to a particular
dwelling. "22
The Court's analysis began with the presumption that "except
in certain carefully defined classes of cases, a search of private
property without proper consent is 'unreasonable' unless it has
been authorized by a valid search warrant."2 Although the war-
rantless searches in dispute did not fall into one of the prescribed
exceptions to the warrant requirement, the Court did not find
them per se unconstitutional. The Court first distinguished hous-
ing code inspections from traditional police searches. Because the
inspections were not searches for evidence of criminal action, they
did not implicate the "historic interests of 'self-protection,'" but
affected "only the less intense 'right to be secure from intrusion
into personal privacy.' 1924
Next, the Court provided three reasons why area-wide inspec-
tions conducted without probable cause to believe violations ex-
isted at individual residences were not unreasonable searches.2"
First, it cited the long history of judicial and public acceptance of
housing inspection programs. Second, the Court determined that
the public interest demanded "that all dangerous conditions be
prevented or abated" and that it was "doubtful that any other can-
21 Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966) ("[tlhe overriding function of the
Fourth Amendment is to protect personal privacy and dignity against unwarranted intru-
sion by the State").
21 387 U.S. 523 (cited in note 5).
22 Id. at 538.
" Id. at 528-29 (cites omitted).
24 Id. at 530, citing Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959) (upholding a warrantless
inspection for housing code violations made by a health inspector). As the Court pointed out
in Camara, most such codes were enforced by criminal penalties despite their stated intent
of self-protection. 387 U.S. at 531.
21 Id. at 536-37.
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vassing technique would achieve acceptable results."26 Finally, the
Court described the searches as "a relatively limited invasion of
the urban citizen's privacy" because they were "neither personal in
nature nor aimed at the discovery of evidence of crime. ''27
The Court's reasoning in Camara changed the nature of the
inquiry into the reasonableness of searches. The traditional ap-
proach of evaluating the sufficiency of information on which inves-
tigating officials based searches gave way to a balancing of the re-
spective interests of the state and the individual. With Camara,
"balancing the need to search against the invasion which the
search entails," became the principal analytic tool in all warrant-
less search cases.28
Since Camara, the Court has identified several characteristics
of non-traditional searches which distinguish them from tradi-
tional searches and which justify subjecting them to a less de-
manding constitutional standard. Non-traditional searches, accord-
ing to the Court, are different because: They are conducted for
purposes of administration or regulation and not for purposes of
enforcing criminal laws;" they are conducted in circumstances
where the individual's expectation of privacy is already reduced;30
or they are conducted pursuant to some "special need, beyond the
normal need for criminal law enforcement."3 '
" Id. at 537. All constitutional restrictions on enforcement techniques represent some
sacrifice of potential enforcement mechanisms, but the very idea of a constitutional limita-
tion implies such sacrifices. See Wayne R. LaFave, 3 Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the
Fourth Amendment sec. 10.1(b) at 186 (1978).
" Camara, 387 U.S. at 537.
20 Id.
29 "We may agree that a routine inspection of the physical condition of private prop-
erty is a less hostile intrusion than the typical policeman's search for the fruits and instru-
mentalities of crime." Id. at 530; Wyman, 400 U.S. at 322 (cited in note 5) (welfare
caseworker's home visit "is not one by police or uniformed authority"); Almeida-Sanchez,
413 U.S. at 278 (cited in note 7) (Powell, concurring) (roving patrols along the border "are
undertaken primarily for administrative rather than prosecutorial purposes"). But see
O'Connor, 107 S. Ct. at 1505 (cited in note 4); Burger, 107 S. Ct. at 2651 (cited in note 5)
(no constitutional significance attaches to fact that police rather than "administrative"
agents conduct search). "It should be emphasized that ... [administrative search cases in-
volving home visits by welfare caseworkers and regulated industry inspections] ... are not
distinguishable from police search cases because the police are not involved or because no
criminal proceeding results, but because the government intrusion is less severe and enforce-
ment problems are more formidable." Peter S. Greenberg, The Balance of Interests Theory
and the Fourth Amendment: A Selective Analysis of Supreme Court Action Since Camara
and See, 61 Cal. L. Rev. 1011, 1035 (1973).
30 See Dewey, 452 U.S. 594 (cited in note 5) (workplace inspections); Burger, 107 S. Ct.
2636 (regulated industry); Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1972) (fire inspection).
" T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. at 749 (cited in note 4) (Blackmun, dissenting).
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The "administrative" or "non-criminal" search distinction is
faulty for several reasons. First, a search conducted for purely "ad-
ministrative" or "regulatory" purposes should not be any less con-
stitutionally suspect than an ordinary criminal search, because en-
suring compliance with a building code or an occupational safety
rule is no less an exercise of state authority than protecting prop-
erty rights through enforcement of a law against theft. Second,
there is often no principled reason certain infractions result in civil
rather than criminal penalties (or vice versa). Third, many offenses
are penalized by both types of sanctions, a point the Court recog-
nized when it first employed the distinction in a non-traditional
search case.32
Although some of these non-criminal searches may occur in
circumstances of reduced expectations of privacy, they still have
the same potential for abusive law enforcement practices that
arises whenever a government official-even one whose duty is not
criminal law enforcement-conducts a search. Granted, such
searches might be less constitutionally suspect because they are
conducted according to a predetermined scheme which ensures
procedural regularity." The regularity that cannot be demanded of
police officers dealing with unpredictable situations can be de-
manded of administrative officers by requiring a policy delineating
the purposes and procedures of the non-criminal search. Even min-
imally intrusive searches to enforce civil laws can be applied in a
discriminatory fashion. 4
II. FOURTH AMENDMENT IMPLICATIONS OF DRUG TESTING
Regardless of what interests justify or fail to justify testing,
any search implicates certain values that are protected or advanced
by the Fourth Amendment. Identifying these values is a prerequi-
site to determining the validity of the interests that support or op-
pose the search. Moreover, the highly fact-specific nature of
Fourth Amendment cases" makes it especially important to ascer-
" Camara, 387 U.S. at 527 (cited in note 5) (maximum penalty for refusing inspection
was $500 fine and/or six months imprisonment). But see Burger, 107 S. Ct. at 2649 (cited in
note 5) (administrative scheme employing searches made on less than probable cause upheld
despite imposition of penal sanctions).
" In Camara the Court held as reasonable housing inspections based on administrative
warrants. 387 U.S. at 538.
"4 The Court recognized this in Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979) (warrantless,
discretionary roving stops of cars for license checks are unreasonable).
" One former Solicitor General has noted:
In dealing with search and seizure cases, the Court is ... confronted with a mas-
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tain how a particular search compromises these identified values
and advances the asserted government interest in conducting the
search.
A. Restriction of Potentially Abusive Law Enforcement
Techniques
A principal value advanced by the Fourth Amendment is the
restriction of abusive law enforcement techniques. 6 Under current
Fourth Amendment doctrine, the reasonableness of non-traditional
searches depends upon the government's purpose for conducting
the search.37 The Amendment itself, though, is directed not at the
minds of legislators, administrators or law enforcement personnel,
but at their actions. It restricts the use of a law enforcement tech-
nique-the search. In this respect, the Court's non-traditional
search jurisprudence ignores a principal value of the Amendment.
Concerns about the limits of appropriate law enforcement and
the potential for abuse of government authority arise whenever the
government acts to identify or examine individuals for wrongdoing.
Although a drug test is said to enforce only an employment rule
(against using illicit drugs on the job) rather than a law against
possessing drugs, testing by government officials has the same po-
tential for abuse as law enforcement techniques. 8
B. Privacy
To the extent that the Supreme Court has emphasized one
purpose of the Fourth Amendment, it is that of protecting individ-
ual's rights of privacy.39 Drug testing intrudes on one's reasonable
sive dilemma .... Any case in the search and seizure area will be different from
every other case. There is only limited precedential value in the decisions, and
experience shows that language used in one . . .often has to be qualified or ex-
plained away when a different case arises with slightly different facts .... Search
and seizure cases do not present ordinary legal controversies, for they arise under
the Constitution, and thus the variations in the facts in these cases are of consti-
tutional significance. This means that, in each case, the Supreme Court not only
must decide what the facts are, but must determine, in rather minute detail, just
what the significance of the facts, or the combination of facts, is in the case which
is before it.
Erwin N. Griswold, Search and Seizure: A Dilemma of the Supreme Court 39-40 (1975).
"6 Terry, 392 U.S. at 12-13 (cited in note 7).
" See recent administrative search cases cited in note 5.
" O'Connor, 107 S. Ct. at 1505 (cited in note 4) (Scalia, concurring) ("[tihe identity of
the searcher (police vs. employer) is relevant not to whether Fourth Amendment protections
apply, but only to whether the search of a protected area is reasonable").
"' Texas v. Brown, 103 S. Ct. 1535, 1546 (1983) (Stevens, concurring) ("[tlhe Amend-
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expectation of privacy in at least three ways. First, drug testing by
urinalysis intrudes on the privacy of one's bodily integrity"' and
personal modesty. This intrusion is exacerbated when employees
must provide urine samples in the presence of an observer, who
may be their supervisor. Second, drug testing intrudes on reasona-
ble expectations of privacy by disclosing information about one's
medical conditions, such as epilepsy, pregnancy or drug treatments
for mental illness."
A third way in which drug tests infringe on reasonable expec-
tations of privacy is by disclosing conduct to which the tester has
no legitimate claim. In general, employees presumably have a rea-
sonable expectation that their off-the-job behavior, which can be
detected by drug tests, will remain private; this reasonable expec-
tation of privacy must be examined in the circumstances of the
particular search."2 For example, if legitimate employment qualifi-
cations proscribe off-the-job use of certain substances, such a
ment protects two different interests of the citizen-the interest in retaining possession of
property and the interest in maintaining personal privacy. A seizure threatens the former, a
search the latter"); Warden, 387 U.S. at 304 (cited in note 7) ("principal object of the
Fourth Amendment is the protection of privacy rather than property") (emphasis added);
Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 767 (cited in note 20) ("[t]he overriding function of the Fourth
Amendment is to protect personal privacy and dignity against unwarranted intrusion by the
State"); T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 335 (cited in note 4) ("[tlhe basic purpose of this Amendment,
... is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by
government officials") (emphasis added), quoting Camara, 387 U.S. at 528 (cited in note 5).
40 While providing a urine sample does not physically break the integrity of the body
(as does, for example, a blood test), urine is a fluid most people ordinarily expect to keep
from public view. In Schmerber, 384 U.S. 757 (cited in note 20), the Court upheld the war-
rantless removal of blood from an unconscious arrestee in order to perform a blood-alcohol
test, finding that the Fourth Amendment was satisfied because of two factors: The arrest
had been made with probable cause to believe the defendant was intoxicated, and the police
could reasonably believe the evidence would soon be destroyed without quick action.
Neither factor applies in the case of a random drug test made without individualized
suspicion.
"' See note 61 and accompanying text. The ability of a particular search to recognize
more than just contraband necessarily changes its implications with respect to an individ-
ual's privacy. See James J. Tomkovicz, Beyond Secrecy for Secrecy's Sake: Toward an Ex-
panded Vision of the Fourth Amendment Privacy Province, 36 Hastings L.J. 645, 723 (1985)
(distinguishing between canine sniff searches of luggage that detect both legal and illegal
drugs and searches that identify only contraband, arguing that the former threatens "our
interests in secrecy and ... the further benefits afforded by informational privacy preserva-
tion [which] might well furnish legitimate bases for recognizing privacy needs").
42 "The reasonableness of the employee's expectation of privacy and the appropriate-
ness of a proposed search must therefore be analyzed in the context of each employment
setting." Policemen's Benev. Ass'n. of N.J. v. Washington Tp., 672 F. Supp. 779, 787
(D.N.J. 1987), judgment reversed on other grounds by 850 F.2d 133 (3d Cir. 1988) (finding
that police are a regulated industry and therefore Fourth Amendment warrant and probable
cause requirements did not apply).
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search might not intrude on reasonable expectations of privacy.'3
However, when employers use drug tests merely to evaluate ethical
demeanor or personal integrity," the intrusion on employee pri-
vacy seems unjustified. 5 In other words, the less the conduct being
tested is related to an employee's behavior on the job, the lesser
the claim the government legitimately can make to examine the
conduct."6
Several courts have questioned whether one can have any ex-
pectation of privacy in urine by noting that there is no reasonable
expectation of privacy in blood, breath, fingernail scrapings or gar-
bage.47 These analogies misconstrue the reasonable expectation of
privacy analysis, a case-by-case approach, and attempt to trans-
form it into a per se rule. A per se rule, however, squarely contra-
"' Professional athletes might be an example of such employees, provided that their job
qualifications include, for health reasons, restrictions on conduct off the job.
" See, in this context, Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170 (cited in note 1) (justifying random
mandatory drug tests on ground that off-the-job drug use by employees necessarily im-
pugned integrity).
'5 Unlike searches, such as airport or courtroom magnetometers, that arguably identify
contraband or detect ongoing illegal activities and so enforce some law, drug tests at best
indicate only past activities that may have been illegal. Accordingly, cases upholding court-
house and airport searches conducted on a mass basis without either probable cause or rea-
sonable suspicion are readily distinguishable. See McMorris v. Alioto, 567 F.2d 897 (9th Cir.
1978) (courthouse searches constitutional because entrant consents to be searched); Down-
ing v. Kunzig, 454 F.2d 1230 (6th Cir. 1972) (courthouse searches held not unreasonable);
United States v. Doran, 482 F.2d 929 (9th Cir. 1973) (airport magnetometer searches are
consensual); United States v. Albarado, 495 F.2d 799 (2d Cir. 1974) (upheld airport magne-
tometer searches conducted without warrant or probable cause because of public safety con-
cerns and minimal intrusiveness of the search). See also Wilkinson v. Forst, 832 F.2d 1330
(2d Cir. 1987) (upholding general magnetometer searches conducted without individualized
suspicion at Ku Klux Klan rallies).
" Testing for on-the-job impairment, unlike testing for off-the-job drug use, presents
no concerns about intruding on an individual's legitimate expectation of privacy in off-the-
job conduct where the testing proceeds on reasonable suspicion of impairment. Neverthe-
less, such testing raises concerns about an employee's legitimate expectation of privacy with
respect to humiliation and disclosure of physiological secrets.
'7 See Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507, 1514 (D.N.J. 1986) (urine testing
likened to involuntary blood test); Amalgamated Tran. U., 1277 v. Sunline Tran. Agcy., 663
F. Supp. 1560 (C.D. Cal. 1987) (destructibility of "evidence" found in urine samples similar
to information obtained through involuntary fingernail scrapings of murder suspect). But
see Von Raab, 816 F.2d at 177 (cited in note 1) (urinalysis less intrusive than blood sample
because it requires no invasion of bodily integrity).
But see also Feliciano v. City of Cleveland, 661 F. Supp. 578, 586 (N.D. Ohio 1987) ("a
characterization of an intrusion as 'major' or 'minor' is not critical to deciding whether a
'legitimate expectation of privacy' exists. Instead, Schmerber rests upon the well-established
proposition that that which is exposed to public perception is not protected by the [Flourth
[A]mendment, while that which requires action to expose legitimately concealed contents is
so protected") (cites omitted).
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dicts the principle set forth in Katz v. United States,4 8 where the
notion of reasonable expectation of privacy was recognized. In
Katz the Court held that an individual has a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy in a telephone conversation made from a public
phone booth. Rejecting the formalistic analysis which examined
whether a phone booth was a constitutionally protected area, the
Court constructed a more realistic approach to Fourth Amendment
protections: "[T]he Fourth Amendment protects people, not
places. What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his
own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protec-
tion. 4 9 According to Katz, the focus of the inquiry into the reason-,
able expectation of privacy is not the object being tested (e.g.,
urine, blood or breath), but the circumstances under which the
testing, and the information retrieval, occur.
Privacy concerns do not point in one direction for all drug
testing scenarios. Random testing of all employees for evidence of
drug use, without even reasonable suspicion, invades the privacy of
all employees in their non-employment related behavior. Immedi-
ate post-accident testing for impairment of employees whose ac-
tions could have contributed to the accident, by contrast, invades
only the tested employees' lesser claim to privacy in their present,
on-the-job conduct10 A harder case is that of post-accident testing
for past drug use. A situation in which an employee's involvement
in an accident is itself grounds for reasonable suspicion is arguably
analogous to a case of an ordinary search based on probable cause.
At some point, the degree of individuation of the suspicion affects
its reasonableness as a predicate for testing.5 1
A requirement of sufficiently individuated suspicion also oper-
ates to minimize the intrusion necessary for an employer legiti-
mately to maintain standards of employee behavior on the job. At
the very least the Fourth Amendment protects employees against
totally unnecessary searches.2 It must be understood as requiring
4- 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
9 Id. at 351.
50 However, even this form of testing was invalidated by one court. See Burnley, 839
F.2d 575 (cited in note 1).
" See, for example, id. (testing entire train crew after accident held unconstitutional
because "particularized suspicion is essential to finding toxicological testing ... justified at
its inception. Accident, incidents or rule violations, by themselves, do not create reasonable
grounds for suspecting that tests will demonstrate alcohol or drug impairment in any one
railroad employee, much less an entire train crew"). See also Feliciano v. City of Cleveland,
661 F. Supp. 578 (N.D. Ohio 1987) (reasonable individualized suspicion that a police officer
is using illicit drugs must be required for urinalysis to be reasonable).
"2 Even if the Fourth Amendment imposes no requirement that officials conducting a
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that the government provide evidence indicating drug use among
certain employees or a discrete group of employees.13 The govern-
ment cannot circumvent the Fourth Amendment by asserting some
interest in searching without demonstrating a connection between
the individuals searched and the "drug problem" it seeks to
remedy.
C. Procedural Regularity
In the interest of maintaining procedural regularity, the war-
rant and probable cause requirements of the Fourth Amendment
ensure that a search is justified and that it is not arbitrary.5 4 Any
bright line standard, in contrast to a balancing test, provides a
benchmark by which official action can be judged more easily than
according to a case-by-case analysis. Objective indicia of drug use
or impairment, or reasonable suspicion based on specific articul-
able facts and reasonable inferences therefrom,55 further the pur-
pose of procedural regularity.
III. THE CHALLENGE TO THE COURT'S NON-TRADITIONAL SEARCH
JURISPRUDENCE POSED BY DRUG TESTING OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEES
Recent cases examining the constitutionality of several differ-
ent mandatory drug testing programs reveal the shortcomings of
the Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. 5  Mandatory urinal-
ysis testing of public employees raises legitimate concerns on the
part of both the individual being tested and the government em-
search use the least intrusive means available, under a balancing test the government must
be able at least to justify the search on the basis of some interest. See discussion at note
100, concerning requirement that search use least intrusive means available.
13 At least one court adopted this approach. See Jones v. McKenzie, 833 F.2d 335 (D.C.
Cir. 1987) (upholding drug testing of school bus drivers and attendants after school officials
noted evidence of a "drug culture," including drug paraphernalia and impaired employees,
among the group of employees to be tested).
54 See Anthony Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 Minn. L. Rev.
349, 411 (1974).
" Terry, 392 U.S. at 21 (cited in note 7) ("in justifying the particular intrusion the
police officers must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together
with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion") (footnote
omitted).
" Challenged testing procedures have ranged from post-accident testing, Division 241
Amalgamated Transit U. v. Suscy, 538 F.2d 1264 (7th Cir. 1976); Burnley, 839 F.2d 575
(cited in note 1); or impairment testing based on the reasonable suspicion of two superiors,
id., to applicant or random individualized testing of current employees, Von Raab, 816 F.2d
170 (cited in note 1); Jones, 833 F.2d 335 (cited in note 53); to mass random urinalysis tests
of all employees without any suspicion, Capua, 643 F. Supp. 1507 (cited in note 47); Sunline
Transit, 663 F. Supp. 1560 (cited in note 47).
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ployer who conducts the test. In addition, drug tests challenge the
Court's approach to non-traditional searches because, although
drug tests fit within many of the Court's categories of permissible
non-traditional searches, drug testing also implicates many of the
Fourth Amendment values specifically protected in the context of
traditional searches.
Courts have upheld employee drug testing programs by in-
cluding them under non-traditional search exceptions to the prob-
able cause requirement, such as the exceptions for searches in reg-
ulated industries57 or searches in response to "special needs"
beyond ordinary law enforcement. Unlike typical non-traditional
searches, however, drug testing is not directed toward finding ac-
tual contraband or detecting illegal conduct.58 Rather, drug testing
merely chronicles the past presence of illegal substances.59 While
the purpose of these searches is not the enforcement of laws,60 pos-
itive test results can cause employee dismissals and damage em-
ployment records."' And while the government can hardly be con-
sidered a regulated industry for purposes of Fourth Amendment
analysis, some courts evaluating drug testing programs have analo-
gized it to one.62
Because public employees execute a public trust when they
' Shoemaker v. Handel, 795 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir. 1986) (jockeys considered employees in
a "regulated industry").
" The Court has upheld various non-traditional searches directed at uncovering contra-
band or illegal conduct. See, for example, Burger, 107 S. Ct. 2636 (cited in note 5) (search
designed to find stolen goods); Wyman, 400 U.S. 309 (cited in note 5) (welfare caseworker's
home visit designed to identify recipients no longer entitled to receive assistance).
" Drug tests can also detect current impairment or the use of legal substances, such as
alcohol, which is otherwise prohibited by workplace rules. Impairment tests raise some of
the same Fourth Amendment concerns that are raised by testing for past use (such as the
restriction of potentially abusive law enforcement techniques, procedural regularity and ac-
countability) as well as some different Fourth Amendment issues (principally concerning
privacy). See generally Section II.
o Virtually no employee drug tests are administered by traditional law enforcement
personnel, and the test results are almost never given to the police.
1 The test also involves humiliation, and can yield information concerning "physiologi-
cal secrets" of the employee that is unrelated to illegal drug use and to which the employer
has no legitimate claim. Much of this information can be used to discriminate against em-
ployees. See Note, Employee Drug-Testing Legislation: Redrawing the Battlelines in the
War on Drugs, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 1453, 1458 (1987) (drug tests can reveal too much informa-
tion, tempting employers to eliminate employees with medical problems); David A. Miller,
Mandatory Urinalysis Testing and the Privacy Rights of Subject Employees: Toward a Gen-
eral Rule of Legality under the Fourth Amendment, 48 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 201, 207 ("a urine
specimen can be analyzed to reveal whether an employee is pregnant, is using illicit medica-
tion, or is being treated for a heart condition, manic-depression, epilepsy, diabetes or schizo-
phrenia") (footnote omitted).
" Von Raab, 816 F.2d at 179-80 (cited in note 1).
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perform their jobs, they arguably have a lower expectation of pri-
vacy than employees in the private sector. 3 Moreover, the govern-
ment's "special needs," beyond ordinary law enforcement, may be
held to justify drug testing programs." But drug testing is explic-
itly not designed for either ordinary or extraordinary law enforce-
ment purposes; testing is designed to improve safety, efficiency or
integrity in the workplace. In practice, however, drug testing pro-
grams are attempts to enforce criminal laws against drug posses-
sion by making tested individuals prove their innocence. This is a
traditional search for evidence of criminal activity and plainly vio-
lates the Fourth Amendment.
The Fourth Amendment issues raised by employee drug test-
ing are illustrated in a drug testing decision now before the Su-
preme Court, National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab."
In Von Raab, the U.S. Customs Service sought to test employees
applying for certain "sensitive" positions." The Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit first found drug testing to be a search under
the Fourth Amendment,6 7 then examined the reasonableness of the
search under an extremely broad balancing formula: "[E]ach dif-
ferent kind of search must be assessed by balancing the social and
government need for it against the risk that the search will itself
undermine the social order by unduly invading personal rights of
privacy."" In a sweeping characterization of the government's
need to search, the Fifth Circuit accepted as justification for the
testing program the "major national concern" about preventing il-
legal drug use towards which Congress had "appropriated unprece-
dented sums."'6 9
" See, for example, id. at 178.
" These "special needs" also result in lowered expectations of privacy for schoolchil-
dren, T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (cited in note 4); probationers, Griffin, 107 S. Ct. 3164 (cited in
note 5); and public employees, O'Connor, 107 S. Ct. 1492 (cited in note 4).
66 816 F.2d 170 (cited in note 1).
66 "Sensitive" positions include those involving interdiction of illicit drugs, carrying a
firearm or access to classified information; covered employees range from "top administra-
tive posts" to "even those clerical workers assigned to the tasks described." Von Raab, 816
F.2d at 173 (cited in note 1). Although the drug testing program provided for urinalysis of
both applicants and current employees seeking a transfer to a sensitive position, the suit
concerned only employees seeking a transfer.
67 The court found drug tests to be a search because of the reasonable expectation of
privacy people ordinarily have in urination, their reasonable expectation of privacy in the
physiological information contained in their urine and the fact that urine is not a personal
characteristic one expects to display to the government (unlike hair or handwriting). Id. at
175-76.
6 Id. at 176 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
'9 Id. at 172.
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These considerations, however, are unrelated to the reasona-
bleness of any particular drug testing program and indicate the de-
gree to which balancing has converted a fact-dependent Fourth
Amendment inquiry into an assessment of broad policy issues.
Without explaining why random searches without any suspicion of
a drug problem-let alone individualized suspicion of drug use by
particular employees-were necessary and proper, the court merely
reviewed the justifications for testing against the backdrop of the
rubrics under which the Supreme Court has considered non-tradi-
tional searches.
First, the court found that the search minimized administra-
tive discretion and, in turn the potential for abuse or employee
harassment, because drug test results are either positive or nega-
tive.70 The danger of excessive administrative discretion, however,
exists only when the class of persons who might be searched or the
type of search to which they might be subjected is at all discretion-
ary. When all employees must submit to an identical search there
is, unquestionably, no administrative discretion as to the subjects
of the test. But reducing searchers to automatons begs the initial
constitutional question of whether the search is justified.
Second, the court in Von Raab found the government's inter-
est in conducting the search justified in part by the enormity of
the nation's drug problem. Even if true as a policy matter, this
factor was both irrelevant to the Fourth Amendment analysis and
inaccurate given the facts of the case. The Customs Service sus-
pected no significant drug use among its employees.7 The court
also reasoned that because drug use by Customs Service employees
impugns the employee's honesty,72 undermines the public's trust in
the agency and makes the employee particularly susceptible to
blackmail or bribery, the drug testing program was fully justified.
The Supreme Court's non-traditional search jurisprudence
supports searches for objects or conduct on less than probable
cause, but it does not support searches designed simply to dissuade
70 Id. at 177.
7' The Commissioner had described the Customs Service as predominantly drug free, a
claim borne out by several months of testing. Id. at 173.
72 Although drug use is currently perceived as a problem of national proportions, it is
difficult to see why the possibility of drug use should undermine public confidence in law
enforcement any more than any number of possible illegalities by police officers would un-
dermine public confidence. Yet it has not been suggested that police officers' homes could be
systematically searched for signs of other possible illegalities in order to sustain public con-
fidence. Feliciano, 661 F. Supp at 588 (cited in note 47).
"' Von Raab, 816 F.2d at 178 (cited in note 1).
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people from engaging in certain conduct or from possessing certain
objects. In considering each of these rationales, the court in Von
Raab repeatedly examined the policy justification for the chal-
lenged testing, rather than the much narrower, more fact-specific
situation that was actually before it: Drug testing in a particular
employment setting without any individualized suspicion.
Finally, the court fit the testing program into several of the
rubrics established by the Supreme Court in cases of non-tradi-
tional searches. The Fifth Circuit noted that the government had
greater latitude to search as an employer than as law enforcer. 74 It
likened the search to a purely "administrative" one, "neither
designed to enforce criminal laws nor likely to be used to bring
criminal charges against the person investigated, '75 that resembled
a police inventory search of a vehicle, or a welfare caseworker's
visit to a client's home. It analogized the Customs Service to a reg-
ulated industry, in which employees' expectations of privacy are
reduced by the government's need to search for purposes of effec-
tive regulation. The court found no less intrusive measures availa-
ble to the Customs Service, reasoning that neither performance
evaluations nor background checks would be adequate for protect-
ing the integrity of "sensitive" positions.
The opinion in Von Raab epitomizes three shortcomings of the
Court's balancing methodology. First, it provides insufficient pro-
cedural regularity. In theory, a balancing analysis is capable of
maintaining procedural regularity provided that the respective in-
terests of the government and the tested employees are clearly de-
lineated prior to being weighed. As practiced, however, Fourth
Amendment balancing is simply case-by-case determination.76
71 Id. at 178-79.
"' Id. at 179.
7' Consider for example the border search cases, in which the Court sought to delineate
what suspicion a border official (or other law enforcement official near the border) must
demonstrate in order to stop or search a vehicle. In Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. 266 (cited in
note 7), the Court rejected the administrative search and regulated industries analogies and
held that a policy allowing roving stops and searches within 100 miles of the border without
any articulable suspicion was unreasonable because it involved unfettered discretion. Proba-
ble cause or consent was required for the policy to withstand constitutional scrutiny. The
following year, in United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891 (1975), the Court affirmed Almeida-
Sanchez and required probable cause for stops and searches conducted at fixed checkpoints
approximately 60 miles from the border, despite the reduced adniinistrative discretion im-
posed by operating at a checkpoint, because of the excessive discretion retained by individ-
ual officers to select vehicles. The same day, however, in United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,
422 U.S. 873 (1975), the Court upheld roving stops for questioning because it found roving
stops for questioning less intrusive than the roving searches at issue in Almeida-Sanchez,
The articulable suspicion affording a check on the officer's discretion that had been missing
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Absent an identifiable event that employees know will raise a
reasonable suspicion and trigger a government intrusion against
them, it is very difficult to minimize the potential for unjustified
searches." Such searches contradict the very text of the Fourth
Amendment. The Amendment, through the warrant requirement,
sacrifices flexibility on the part of law enforcement personnel for
procedural regularity.78 The Court should not circumvent this fun-
damental, textual choice by evaluating the constitutionality of
searches in a way that stresses doctrinal flexibility and, thus, pro-
vides additional after the fact flexibility for law enforcement per-
sonnel. Further, the increased flexibility for law enforcement per-
sonnel is least necessary when the subjects, purposes and
procedures of the search can be determined prior to its occurrence.
The exigencies of ordinary, "reactive" police work, which fostered
the development of a more flexible warrant requirement, do not
apply in the non-traditional search cases.7 '9
in Ortiz was that the petitioners appeared to be of Mexican ancestry.
Administrative discretion is dangerous because it may be used in a harassing or dis-
criminatory fashion. As the Court points out, Mexican ancestry, "standing alone ... does
not justify stopping all Mexican-Americans to ask if they are aliens." Brignoni-Ponce, 422
U.S. at 887. Nevertheless, the Court later held in Martinez -Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (cited in
note 4) that random stops without individualized suspicion at fixed checkpoints 60-90 miles
from the border were reasonable, because they were no more intrusive than the stops upheld
in Brignoni-Ponce. Confining discretion just by the use of a fixed checkpoint, was precisely
the same reduction in discretion that the Court had found inadequate in the searches de-
scribed in Ortiz.
These cases may be organized logically. A "search" is more intrusive than a "stop," so it
requires more suspicion. Similarly, roving stops involve greater administrative discretion
than stops at fixed checkpoints, so they require more suspicion. Nevertheless, these cases
provide little predictability. In United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531
(1985) the seizure and attempted search of an international traveler's alimentary canal (at a
border in an international airport), a search clearly as intrusive as the search of a car, was
upheld on at most "reasonable suspicion."
" Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972) (vagrancy ordinance void
for vagueness because the ordinance did not provide adequate notice that contemplated
conduct is illegal, and it encouraged arbitrary and erratic enforcement).
" Virtually all non-traditional searches have been held not to require a warrant, or at
most to require only an "administrative warrant" as in Camara. Removing the warrant re-
quirement for administrative searches does not remove the interests the requirement ad-
vances, especially when many non-traditional searches are conducted by law enforcement
personnel for enforcement of criminal law. See, for example, Burger, 107 S. Ct. 2636 (cited
in note 5) (warrantless administrative search of junkyard for stolen auto parts held reasona-
ble, though conducted by police and fruits of the search resulted in penal sanctions, because
goal of the administrative scheme reflected a "substantial interest," the scheme "reasonably
advanced" this interest and the scheme provided an adequate warrant substitute).
7' The identification of exigencies began with the application of the exclusionary rule to
the states in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). Examples of these extensions of the per-
missible reach of searches and seizures undertaken by local law enforcement officials include
Schmerber, 384 U.S. 757 (cited in note 20) (results of warrantless blood test admissible
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A third problem with the Court's balancing approach is that it
fails to examine whether a discretionary standard is necessary in
each case."0 The Court has declined to ensure that searches made
under a discretionary standard are actually the least intrusive ones
available.8 " If balancing is a constitutional exception, the govern-
ment should be required to demonstrate as a threshold matter why
the exception is required in a particular case.
Finally, the Court has generally assumed that the problem
which the government seeks to remedy by a search actually exists,
without requiring any sort of concrete factual showing.82 When the
objects of the search may be objects of moral opprobrium, the re-
quirement of concrete fact finding serves the important function of
distinguishing the presence of genuine societal ills from mere
hysteria.
IV. A PROPOSED CONSTITUTIONAL DRUG TESTING PROGRAM
A. The Need for Fully "Generalized" Balancing in Searches
That Proceed on Less than Probable Cause
The balancing methodology is inadequate, at least for an ini-
because arrest was made with probable cause and evidence was ephemeral); Warden, 387
U.S. 294 (cited in note 7) (evidence gathered without a warrant in hot pursuit admissible);
Terry, 392 U.S. 1 (cited in note 7) (stop and frisk exception to warrant and probable cause
requirements). Such exigencies do not exist in the context of employee drug testing.
o See cases cited in note 4.
S, Any new form of search, particularly one designed to replace other already constitu-
tional forms of searches, should be an improvement either in effectiveness at identifying the
targeted objects or in minimizing intrusiveness. This is an important component of other
Supreme Court balancing analyses, such as First Amendment issues. See Central Hudson
Gas & Elec. v. Public Serv. Comm'n., 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980) (final prong of four part test
addressing restrictions on commercial speech is "whether ... [the regulation] is not more
extensive that is necessary").
Recent decisions deny any general rule that law enforcement personnel must always
employ the least intrusive means available in conducting a search. See Illinois v. Lafayette,
462 U.S. 640, 648 (1983) (reasonableness of particular governmental method does not neces-
sarily or invariably turn on the existence of an alternative, less intrusive means) (police
station search); United States v. Sharpe, 105 S. Ct. 1568, 1576 (1985) ("the question is not
simply whether some other alternative was available, but whether the police acted unreason-
ably in failing to recognize or to pursue it"). Nevertheless, "consideration of alternative
means that might have been employed remains a legitimate factor in [F]ourth [A]mendment
analysis." Wilkinson v. Forst, 832 F.2d 1330, 1340 n. 13 (2d Cir. 1987) (allowing general
magnetometer searches at rally of Ku Klux Klan since they would be less intrusive than
individual pat downs).
82 Sometimes the Court is uninterested in the government's ability to demonstrate that
a problem exists which a search might remedy. See O'Connor, 107 S. Ct. at 1496 (cited in
note 4) ("[t]he specific reason for the entry into [petitioner's] office [to search] is unclear
from the record").
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tial evaluation of a Fourth Amendment claim, because it never
gives content to an individual's Fourth Amendment rights. 3 When
the Court "balances" it often "weighs" conceptions of searches in
general, ignoring the facts of the particular search in question."
Under this form of balancing, the Court generalizes and speculates
far more widely to identify interests in conducting the search than
it does to identify the interests in not conducting the search. 5 This
readiness to generalize interests in favor of testing might be under-
standable considering that whenever the government seeks to
search it is presumably acting for the benefit of all non-tested indi-
viduals. 6 As this "balancing" is practiced, however, no individual
can defeat this substantial interest in conducting a search.
The high threshold for individual interest makes sense when
the government demonstrates the presence, or the likely presence,
of evidence of illegal conduct. Conversely, when the government
cannot demonstrate the likely presence of evidence of illegal con-
duct, all individuals become possible targets of the search, and, ac-
cordingly, have a privacy interest in preventing it. Where the gov-
ernment cannot show probable cause, its interest in conducting the
search should be weighed not against the interest of the individual
who will be searched but against the interests of all similarly situ-
ated individuals who might be searched. For example, if the gov-
ernment conducts a random search without any articulable suspi-
83 See Peter S. Greenberg, 61 Cal. L. Rev. at 1047 (cited in note 29) ("it is necessary to
recognize the danger that the balancing theory can be used to balance away important
[F]ourth [A]mendment protections").
" For example, in T.L.O., the Court decided the appropriate standard for searches of
students by a teacher or school official, although the search at issue had not been conducted
pursuant to any sort of policy and had been designed to locate an object other than what it
actually revealed, 469 U.S. at 328 (cited in note 4); in O'Connor the Court determined the
"appropriate Fourth Amendment standard of reasonableness for a public employer's work
related search of its employee's offices, desks, or file cabinets," 107 S. Ct. at 1500 (cited in
note 4).
11 See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 339 ("against the child's interest in privacy must be set the
substantial interest of teachers and administrators in maintaining discipline in the class-
room"); O'Connor, 107 S. Ct. at 1501-02 (cited in note 4) (employer's interest in "efficient
and proper operation of the workplace," weighed against employee's privacy interests in
their place of work, privacy interests which "are far less than those found at home or in
some other contexts"); Griffin, 107 S. Ct. 3164 (cited in note 5); Camara, 387 U.S. 523 (cited
in note 5).
80 The Court treats presumptions such as these as "constitutional" facts, or facts about
which there is no evidence on the record, but of which there must be judicial recognition in
order for the constitutional inquiry to be meaningful. See Rachel N. Pine, Speculation and
Reality: The Role of Facts in Judicial Protection of Fundamental Rights, 136 U. Pa. L. Rev.
655, 661-65 (1988); Jeffrey M. Shaman, Constitutional Fact: The Perception of Reality by
the Supreme Court, 35 U. Fla. L. Rev. 236 (1983).
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cion, all individuals would oppose the search because they will
have no notice prior to being searched. By comparison, it is in the
interests of more individuals that a search be conducted as the
government makes an increasingly clear and specific demonstration
of the likelihood of obtaining relevant and necessary information
through a search. The balancing analysis, therefore, should "gener-
alize" the Fourth Amendment interests of individuals who oppose
a search in a manner equivalent to the Court's generalization of
the government's interest in conducting the search.
B. The Need for Concrete Fact-finding to Justify a Search
When the Court generalizes the interests that are implicated
by a particular class of searches, it considers the balance of inter-
ests as a policy matter. It asks, "What are the government's inter-
ests in conducting a search in this situation, and do they justify
allowing it on less than probable cause?" ' What is to be demon-
strated by the government through the' use of drug testing is as
relevant to the Fourth Amendment inquiry as the weight of the
interests that enter into the balancing calculus.
The need for a court to identify facts indicating a drug prob-
lem is especially great given the highly fluid nature of the general-
izations supporting the government's interest in conducting the
search.8  The Amendment's protections are fluid not because a
87 This is the classic "legislative fact" inquiry described by Professor Davis. See Ken-
neth C. Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process, 55
Harv. L. Rev. 364, 402 (1942), and Kenneth C. Davis, 2 Administrative Law Treatise
sec. 12:3 (2d ed. 1979). Even modern commentators who reject the distinction between sim-
ply "legislative" and "adjudicative" fact-finding recognize similar divisions between data or
derivations that are of general application and those that are applicable only to the circum-
stances of the inquiry at hand. See, for example, John Monahan and Laurens Walker, Social
Authority: Obtaining, Evaluating, and Establishing Social Science in Law, 134 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 477, 490-91 (1986) (proposal that social science research, with its attributes of general-
ity, be considered as "law" rather than "fact" provided it meets criteria similar to those
applied in evaluating the usefulness of judicial decisions as informative precedent).
Monahan and Walker recognize that the "social authority" concept is "not applicable
where social science is used only as evidence in a specific case. In that instance, the fact
classification, is ... entirely appropriate." Id. at 488 n. 40. They distinguish precedential or
forward looking use of social science data (to determine, for example, whether segregation
stigmatizes minority students with inferiority, or whether random mandatory drug testing
reduces drug use among employees) from its use to adjudicate an issue in a settled legal
context (such as whether consumers were confused by a particular contested trademark, or
whether there is on-the-job drug use among a particular group of employees).
" Some believe the protections of the Fourth Amendment are also fluid. See, Com-
ment, Random Drug Testing of Government Employees: A Constitutional Procedure, 54 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 1335, 1343 (1987) (arguing "fluctuant" nature of Fourth Amendment suggests
that all drug testing of public employees cannot be a per se constitutional violation). To the
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search that is unreasonable today may be reasonable tomorrow,
but because a search that is unreasonable under one set of facts
may be reasonable under a different set of facts. A court therefore
must determine the circumstances of testing anew in each case. 9
C. Elements of a Constitutionally "Reasonable" Drug Testing
Program
A constitutionally reasonable drug testing program should in-
clude several components, the adequacy of which should be ex-
amined through a methodology of fully generalized balancing sup-
ported by concrete fact-finding. The components of such a
permissible testing program are: (1) An adequate degree of suspi-
cion of on-the-job drug use or impairment; (2) sufficiently individ-
uated suspicion; (3) the lack of feasible, less intrusive alternatives;
(4) minimal discretion in administration of the test; and (5) a legit-
imate justification for testing.90
extent that Fourth Amendment protections are not absolute, this is true, as it is true of
virtually every other individual right under the constitution. Nevertheless, the inherent "flu-
idity" of the Amendment, embodied in the reasonableness requirement, must be measured
against the requirement that the government demonstrate something about the likelihood
that it will find a legitimate object of a search.
11 Courts that have made such findings include: Taylor v. O'Grady, 669 F. Supp. 1422
(N.D. Ill. 1987) (urinalysis of prison guards unreasonable where there was no direct evidence
of on the job drug use and less intrusive, more effective procedures to remedy any drug
problem were available); Guiney v. Roache, 833 F.2d 1079, 1085 (1st Cir. 1987) (vacating
district court's abstention in drug testing case and instructing it to conduct traditional fact-
finding concerning degree of local drug problem among public employees); American Fed'n
of Gov't Employees (AFGE) v. Weinberger, 651 F. Supp. 726 (S.D. Ga. 1986) (Army en-
joined from urinalysis testing of civilian police officers absent reasonable suspicion of drug
use); McDonell v. Hunter, 612 F. Supp. 1122 (D. Iowa 1985) (despite government's goal of
identifying possible drug smugglers, drug test of Corrections Department employees absent
reasonable suspicion is impermissible under the Fourth Amendment); Rushton v. Nebraska
Public Power District, 653 F. Supp. 1510, 1524 (D. Neb. 1987) ("pervasive and comprehen-
sive regulatory scheme" to which a nuclear power plant was subject gave plant employees a
diminished expectation of privacy and hence made random drug screening program reasona-
ble); Feliciano, 661 F. Supp. at 587-88 (cited in note 47) ("the City must demonstrate a
nexus between its need for drug testing and work-related misconduct which adversely af-
fects its operations as an employer of police officers. This showing can be made by two
methods of fact-finding: non-adjudicative fact-finding of a compelling need on a national
level for urinalysis of police officers, or adjudicative fact-finding, by evidence offered in this
case, of a compelling need created by circumstances distinctive to this case").
" Many of these components have been suggested as part of a well-planned drug test-
ing program. See Mark A. Rothstein, Drug Testing in the Workplace: The Challenge to
Employment Relations and Employment Law, 63 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 683, 734-43 (1987) (sug-
gesting all these as elements of a "legal, ethical, and effective drug testing program," with an
additional requirement that "test procedures or resulting personnel actions do not violate
applicable legal rights of applicants and employees").
[1988:
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1. Degree of Suspicion. The hallmark of a non-traditional
search is that it proceeds on less than probable cause and that this
reduced degree of suspicion is necessary to deter the prohibited
activity effectively or to identify the contraband material.' While
drug testing conducted without probable cause and designed solely
to enforce laws prohibiting drug use or possession is clearly uncon-
stitutional,92 drug testing of public employees is presumably, and
often explicitly, not given for this purpose."' Because testing for
on-the-job impairment need only be based on reasonable suspi-
cion,9 the degree of suspicion is most important in cases involving
9 In Camara, the Court upheld housing inspections without probable cause because
the public interest demanded both "a relatively limited invasion of the urban citizen's pri-
vacy" that was neither "personal in nature nor aimed at the discovery of evidence of crime"
and "that all dangerous conditions be prevented or abated." 387 U.S. at 537 (cited in note
5).
All constitutional restrictions on enforcement techniques represent a sacrifice of poten-
tial enforcement activities, but the very idea of a constitutional limitation demands such
sacrifices. See Wayne R. LaFave, 3 Search and Seizure sec. 10.1(b) at 186 (cited in note 26)
(emphasis added):
A more fruitful line of analysis, compared to this overstated need for 100 per cent
enforcement [in Camara], is to consider whether the traditional probable cause
test will permit an acceptable level of enforcement. Although the Court's opinion
does not reflect a careful consideration of this question, thinking along these lines
may lie behind the expressed concern for acceptable results and the observation
that dangerous conditions may not be observable from outside the building.
See also, for example, Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 557 (cited in note 4) (requirement of
reasonable suspicion for stops at border checkpoints would "largely eliminate any deterrent
to the conduct of well-disguised smuggling operations").
92 See Schmerber, 384 U.S. 757 (cited in note 20) (upholding warrantless withdrawal of
blood from individual arrested for driving while intoxicated only where arrest was made
with probable cause). Schmerber relied on probable cause based on individualized suspicion.
See U.S. v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531 (1985) (explaining Schmerber required
police have a particularized suspicion that the evidence sought would be found within an
individual's body) (cited in Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n. v. Burnley, 839 F.2d 575 (9th
Cir. 1988), cert. granted 108 S. Ct. 2033). A search made on probable cause without individ-
ualized suspicion (such as probable cause to suspect drug use among a given group of em-
ployees) would a fortiori be unconstitutional. See Camara, 387 U.S. at 536-37 (cited in note
5) (housing inspections made on such "administrative probable cause" reasonable because
they were neither "personal in nature nor aimed at the uncovering of evidence of a crime").
" The regulations at issue in drug testing cases often prohibited the use of test results
in non-employment disciplinary or criminal proceedings against the employee. See, for ex-
ample, Mulholland v. Department of Army, 660 F. Supp. 1565, 1569 (E.D. Va. 1987) (" [tihe
only possible adverse results following a confirmed positive urinalysis test ... are reassign-
ment to an available, non-critical position for which the subject is qualified").
"' Some have argued that the difficulty of observing even on-the-job impairment re-
quires impairment testing with no reasonable suspicion. See Comment, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev.
1335 (cited in note 88). Most impairment testing programs that have been challenged, how-
ever, do not involve testing conducted upon less than reasonable suspicion. See, for example,
Burnley, 839 F.2d 575 (cited in note 1).
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testing for past drug use."
The most stringent pre-test evidentiary requirement is some-
times described as "individualized suspicion based on probable
cause," but there is no necessary relationship between the degree
of suspicion and the degree of individuation." Recent non-tradi-
tional search cases have involved searches made upon individual-
ized suspicion though with less than probable cause.9 7 It does not
follow, however, that allowing a test on less than probable cause
also requires allowing it on less than individualized suspicion. In
order to be reasonable, employee drug testing programs should re-
quire at least reasonable suspicion based upon specific, articulable
facts, the existence of which an employer which conducts testing
must demonstrate to the satisfaction of a court.
2. Individuated Suspicion. Given the variety of workplace en-
vironments, there can be no simple rule concerning the degree of
individuation of suspicion that is constitutionally "reasonable." In-
dividuation depends on two factors: The number of employees sus-
Existing drug tests only identify the presence of drug metabolites. These substances
are produced by past drug use; they are not correlated with current impairment. There is
now no urinalysis test that can identify impairment when tested. See Lance Liebman, Too
Much Information: Predictions of Employee Disease and the Fringe Benefit System, 1988 U.
Chi. Legal F. 57.
See, for example, McDoneUl, 809 F.2d at 1308 (cited in note 89) (urinalysis of prison
personnel upheld testing through non-individuated uniform or "systematic random selection
of those employees Who have regular contact with the prisoners on a day-to-day basis in
medium or maximum security prisons," while requiring that any additional testing of these
and any testing of other employees proceed only on "reasonable suspicion ... [that] con-
trolled substancefs have been used] within the twenty-four hour period prior to the required
test").
But see Feliciano, 661 F. Supp. 578 (cited in note 47) (invalidating urinalysis tests of
entire class of police cadets that was arguably made on reasonable suspicion because there
was no individualized suspicion); Burnley, 839 F.2d at 587 (cited in note 1) (invalidating
post-accident testing for entire crew of a train because "[aiccidents, incidents or rule viola-
tions, by themselves, do not create reasonable grounds for suspecting that tests will demon-
strate alcohol or drug impairment in any one railroad employee, much less an entire train
crew); Jones, 833 F.2d at 339 (cited in note 53) (upholding on less than probable cause
urinalysis tests, in the context of regular medical exams, and specifically not considering
"what level of suspicion might be required for random or individualized testing"); Lovvorn
v. City of Chattanooga, 647 F. Supp. 875, 880 (E.D. Tenn. 1986), afifd 846 F.2d 1539 (6th
Cir. 1988) (fire fighters had diminished expectation of privacy, but though probable cause
not required, balancing of interests requires "some quantum of individualized suspicion
before the tests can be carried out"); Penny v. Kennedy, 648 F. Supp. 815 (E.D. Tenn.
1986), affd, 846 F.2d 1563 (6th Cir. 1988) (no reasonable suspicion was presented to justify
urine tests for every police officer in Chattanooga, Tennessee).
97 See for example, T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (cited in note 4); O'Connor, 107 S. Ct. 1492
(cited in note 4); Griffin, 107 S. Ct. 3164 (cited in note 5); and Burger, 107 S. Ct. 2636 (cited
in note 5). The Court has sometimes expressly avoided reaching the issue of whether indi-
vidualized suspicion is necessary. See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 342 n. 8.
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pected of using drugs at work or being impaired, relative to the
total number of employees, and the relative danger to others posed
by an impaired employee. A requirement of individuation means
that an employer must at least attempt to isolate the employee or
group of employees about whom it has a reasonable suspicion of
on-the-job drug use or impairment. Although "reasonable suspi-
cion" is an elastic concept, at a minimum it requires one instance
of positively individualized suspicion, unless the individual or indi-
viduals impaired on the job present overwhelming danger to
others." Even in these circumstances, reasonable suspicion that is
not individualized should still be supported by concrete evidence
of on-the-job drug use. 9 Increased individuation of suspicion, es-
pecially to the extent that it can be achieved through heightened
supervision or more thorough performance evaluations, is prefera-
ble for purposes of protecting employees' rights.
3. Availability of less intrusive alternatives. The Supreme
Court has stated that "tihe reasonableness of any particular gov-
ernmental activity does not necessarily or invariably turn on the
existence of alternative 'less intrusive' means."' 0 In this context,
the Court has held that "reactive" police activities need not always
meet a least intrusive means test.'01 The demands of "reactive" po-
lice work, however, do not apply to employee drug testing pro-'
grams. Police admittedly have no particular facility for evaluating,
without a search, the contents of an arrestee's personal effects or a
car's passengers or cargo. 02 Employers, by contrast, legitimately
can be expected to monitor and review an employee's performance
11 At least one court has recognized this. Sunline Tran. Agcy., 663 F. Supp. at 1568 n. 4
(cited in note 47) ("The Court does not determine whether individualized suspicion is con-
stitutionally required under the overall reasonableness standard adopted for chemical test-
ing of public transportation employees. However, this court can conceive of certain mass-
transit settings where mandatory drug and alcohol testing would be reasonable under a
more generalized quantum of proof. Individualized suspicion, though a usual prerequisite, is
not an 'irreducible requirement' of the Fourth Amendment. Mandatory drug and alcohol
testing based on a generalized reasonable suspicion standard would only be appropriate
where the search implicated minimal privacy interests and where 'other safeguards' were
available to ensure that the employee's expectation of privacy was 'not subject to the discre-
tion of the officer in the field' ") (cites omitted).
" Application of an individuation requirement would make "mass" searches, without
concrete evidence implicating a significant number (or, sometimes, any) employees in on-
the-job drug use or impairment, per se unreasonable.
10O Lafayette, 462 U.S. at 647 (cited in note 81).
Id. at 647-48 (unreasonable to expect police officers to make "fine and subtle distinc-
tions" concerning items that may be legally searched).
102 Id. (citing stationhouse searches, random border stops and searches of a car incident
to an arrest).
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on the job effectively without resort to a drug test. The Court
should require, therefore, that the government as employer use
such non-intrusive and proven methods before embarking upon a
drug testing program.
4. Minimal discretion in administration. Early drug testing
cases often involved standardless programs with procedures deter-
mined on an ad-hoc basis by the test administrator. 0 3 More recent
testing programs generally contain detailed procedures for select-
ing employees for testing and conducting the tests.10 4 Such proce-
dural restrictions on administrative discretion should be required
for every drug testing program. 0 5
5. Justification for drug testing. Recent drug testing cases and
related commentary have suggested several justifications for test-
ing, which include maintaining the integrity and credibility of law
enforcement personnel,' 06 improving the productivity of public em-
ployees,0 7 and reducing the likelihood that public employees will
undertake illegal activities associated with drug use.108 These ratio-
nales, however, fail a balancing inquiry that takes into account
fully generalized interests. 09 Although all three are legitimate em-
103 See for example, Capua, 643 F. Supp. at 1511-12 (cited in note 47) (testing of fire
fighters in which no "written directive, order, departmental policy or regulation [was]
promulgated establishing the basis for such testing and prescribing appropriate standards
and procedures for collecting, testing, and utilizing the information derived").
"' See Burnley, 839 F.2d 575 (cited in note 1).
'0o Confined discretion is already required in administrative searches that are con-
ducted in less sensitive contexts. See Wyman, 400 U.S. 309 (cited in note 5) (welfare
caseworker's home visits).
10I Von Raab, 816 F.2d at 178 (cited in note 1); Bostic v. McClendon, 650 F. Supp. 245,
250 (N.D. Ga. 1986).
107 Feliciano, 661 F. Supp. at 588 (cited in note 47).
'1 Von Raab, 816 F.2d at 178; Feliciano, 661 F. Supp. at 588.
... Integrity and credibility are important components of effective law enforcement, yet
there is no reason to distinguish drug use from any other illicit activity in which trusted
public servants might engage. Some commentators have argued that drug testing is actually
not very intrusive, and this low level of intrusiveness provides a basis for distinguishing
justifiable searches which ensure the integrity of public employees. See Comment, 54 U. Chi.
L. Rev. at 1362 (cited in note 88). If this is correct, it challenges the assertion that public
credibility of law enforcement personnel is in fact questioned when no drug testing program
exists. If the tests measure drug use otherwise not observable on the job, there is no reason
to suspect that the public questions the integrity of law enforcement personnel concerning
whom it has no objective, observable basis to be suspicious. To the extent that the public
may have an unsubstantiated suspicion that law enforcement personnel use illicit drugs,
objective test results will not upend this suspicion.
Increased efficiency or productivity present similar shortcomings as rationales for test-
ing. Tests for a variety of activities, such as smoking, proper diet, adequate rest or exercise
might be given because any of these activities could reduce productivity. The fact that none
of these activities is illegal is constitutionally irrelevant.
Increased propensity to engage in other illegal activities because of drug use is also a
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ployer interests, absent a concrete basis for believing a drug prob-
lem actually exists among particular employees, it seems extraordi-
narily unlikely that the interest in preserving employees' integrity
and productivity, or in eliminating propensity to commit other ille-
gal acts, outweighs the privacy interests of all similarly situated
employees who might be tested.
The only legitimate justification underlying testing for on-the-
job impairment or drug use is workplace safety. In addition, con-
crete evidence of drug use that generates a reasonable suspicion,
even if it cannot be highly individuated, might justify random test-
ing if the nature of the job precludes increased supervision as an
adequate check on drug use and made very low degrees of impair-
ment highly significant."0
V. CONCLUSION
In considering employee drug testing programs, the Supreme
Court faces an opportunity to set right a confused area of Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence. The Court should state simply that the
reach of Camara"' was never meant to extend to non-traditional
searches of the person. If the Court extends Camara's reach, it will
undermine Camara's rationale that a non-traditional search is
"reasonable" because it involves a limited invasion of privacy. The
Court can preserve Camara by requiring that, in order for a testing
program to be "reasonable" under the Fourth Amendment, the
government demonstrate, through concrete facts and at least one
instance of individuation, a reasonable suspicion of on-the-job im-
pairment or drug use among a distinct group of employees. The
Court should also ensure that the program as conducted, rather
than as conceived, employed any less intrusive means and included
a minimum of discretion in administration. Not only were no such
findings made in Von Raab, but the absence of a drug problem was
recognized. The Court should find drug testing programs imple-
mented as in Von Raab "unreasonable" under the Fourth
Amendment.
flawed justification for testing. Susceptibility to blackmail or the need for large quantities of
money accompanies many illegal activities other than illicit drug use. Again, there is no
reason employees might not be better in some sense if they did not use illicit drugs, but
there is no principled reason to distinguish this improvement from an almost infinite num-
ber of others.
"0 See, for example, Jones, 833 F.2d 335 (cited in note 53).
. 387 U.S. 523 (cited in note 5).
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